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Abstract
Animals use a wide variety of strategies to reduce or avoid aggression in
conflicts over resources. These strategies range from sharing resources with-
out outward signs of conflict to the development of dominance hierarchies, in
which initial fighting is followed by the submission of subordinates. Although
models have been developed to analyze specific strategies for resolving con-
flicts over resources, little work has focused on trying to understand why
particular strategies are more likely to arise in certain situations. In this pa-
per, we use a model based on an iterated Hawk–Dove game to analyze how
resource holding potentials (RHPs) and other factors affect whether shar-
ing, dominance relationships, or other behaviors are evolutionarily stable.
We find through extensive numerical simulations that sharing is stable only
when the cost of fighting is low and the animals in a contest have similar
RHPs, whereas dominance relationships are stable in most other situations.
We also explore what happens when animals are unable to assess each other’s
RHP without fighting, and we compare a range of strategies for this problem
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using simulations. We find that the most successful strategies involve a lim-
ited period of assessment followed by a stable relationship in which fights are
avoided, and that the duration of assessment depends both on the costliness
of fighting and on the difference between the animals’ RHPs. Along with
our direct work on modeling and simulations, we develop extensive software
to facilitate further testing; and we make it publicly available at https:
//bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, resource holding potential,
dominance relationships, cooperation, learning
1. Introduction
The question of why animals often avoid overt aggression to settle disputes
(even when in clear conflict over resources) is one that has long intrigued
both modelers and field biologists (Maynard Smith, 1982; Huntingford and
Turner, 1987). Animals from sea anemones to primates have adopted a
variety of strategies for reducing or avoiding aggression. These include using
signals and displays as precursors or even substitutes for damaging fights
(Clutton-Brock and Albon, 1979); sharing resources without any outward
signs of conflict (Wilkinson, 1984); and developing dominance hierarchies, in
which dominant animals have privileged access to resources (Bonabeau, 1999;
Braddock and Braddock, 1955; Beacham and Newman, 1987; Drummond,
2006; Guhl, 1968; O’Donnell, 1998; Pagel and Dawkins, 1997). Intrinsic
factors — such as the value of the resource in dispute (Arnott and Elwood,
2008), the relative strengths of the animals in a contest (Arnott and Elwood,
2009; Beacham and Newman, 1987), signals that are sent between animals
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(Dawkins and Guilford, 1991), and which animal is the resident territory
holder (Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992) — can all affect how conflicts are resolved.
Building on the foundational work of Trivers (1971), Maynard Smith and
Price (1973), and Maynard Smith (1979), a wide variety of game-theoretic
models have been developed to describe the ways in which animals resolve
conflicts (Sandholm, 2012; Weibull, 1995). These include models with con-
ditional strategies in which animals assess individual differences (e.g., in
strength or fighting ability) with displays or signals before deciding whether
or when to attack (Parker, 1974; Clutton-Brock et al., 1979; Parker and
Rubenstein, 1981); sequential assessment with escalation (Enquist et al.,
1990; Enquist and Leimar, 1983; Payne and Pagel, 1996); iterated games,
in which animals repeatedly encounter the same individuals (Axelrod and
Hamilton, 1981); models based on simple learning rules (Fawcett and John-
stone, 2010; Grewal et al., 2013); and models that include winner and loser
effects (where winners are likely to keep winning and losers are likely to keep
losing) (Goessmann et al., 2000; Hsu et al., 2005; Kura et al., 2015, 2016;
Mesterton-Gibbons and Sherratt, 2016).
The large variety of different models often makes it difficult for biolo-
gists without detailed mathematical knowledge to understand the differences
and similarities in the implications of different models. In general, models
in which resources are ultimately divided unequally between ‘winners’ and
‘losers’ (Eshel and Sansone, 2001; Eshel, 2005; Fawcett and Johnstone, 2010;
Hammerstein, 1981; Houston and McNamara, 1991; Kura et al., 2015, 2016;
Mesterton-Gibbons et al., 2014, 2016) are often based on the Hawk–Dove
framework described in Maynard Smith (1979), whereas models that con-
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centrate on the evolution of sharing and other apparently paradoxical acts
of cooperation (Baek et al., 2017; Carvalho et al., 2016; Doebeli and Hauert,
2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993a,b; Nowak, 2012; Trivers, 2006) are often
based on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) framework described in Ax-
elrod (1984). This distinction poses the question of whether one needs to
consider rather different models for outcomes with cooperation versus overt
aggression. Our aim in this paper is to show that, by contrast, one can use
a single scheme — a modified version of the Hawk–Dove model that was
developed by Maynard Smith (1982) — to predict the observed wide variety
of possible resolutions to animal conflicts, including resource-sharing, dom-
inance relationships, overt conflict, and other social structures. By making
a small number of biologically realistic modifications to the original Hawk–
Dove model, we show that it is possible to derive many of the currently
employed game-theoretic models of animal conflict and cooperation (includ-
ing Conditional Hawk–Dove, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift) and to explain
the widespread occurrence of dominance hierarchies in animal societies. Our
model also makes it easy to simulate many different games and to explore
the effects of different assumptions and parameter values. In this way, we
hope to facilitate communication between mathematical modelers and field
biologists, leading to a better understanding of why different animals resolve
their conflicts in such different ways
Our paper proceeds as follows. We present our model in Section 2. We
demonstrate how it shares several features with other animal interaction
models in the literature (Eshel and Sansone, 2001; Eshel, 2005; Mesterton-
Gibbons et al., 2014) and that in certain limits it reduces to a form of the IPD
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that was described in Axelrod (1984). Importantly, our model addresses how
differences in resource holding potential (RHP) can affect animals’ optimal
strategies while also providing a framework for modeling progressive assess-
ment of RHP by enabling animals’ behaviors to change as information about
RHP is learned through experience (Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; Parker
and Rubenstein, 1981; Enquist and Leimar, 1983). In Section 3, we investi-
gate evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) for cases in which animals begin
with complete knowledge of their RHPs relative to their opponents. This
then forms the basis for the analysis in Section 4, where we describe and an-
alyze various strategies by which animals can use fights to learn about their
RHP relative to those of their opponents. We conclude and discuss the im-
plications of our results in Section 5. Our software is available is at https://
bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/, and
we encourage readers to pursue our ideas further and extend them.
2. Model development
2.1. An iterated Hawk–Dove game with winners and losers
We model the interactions of two animals, A and B, who interact with
each other repeatedly in a contest for resources. Our model is based on
the Hawk–Dove (HD) game, which was developed by Maynard Smith and
coworkers as a model of a single conflict between animals over a shareable
resource (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1979, 1982). In
the classical HD game, each animal has a choice between a Hawk strategy, in
which it is prepared to escalate the conflict to obtain control of the resource,
and a Dove strategy, in which it will retreat from an escalated conflict. If two
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Doves encounter each other, they share the resource equally. If a Hawk and
a Dove encounter each other, the Hawk takes the entire resource, leaving the
Dove with nothing. If two Hawks encounter each other, a fight ensues. We
explicitly present relevant terminology, such as ‘fights’ and others, in Section
2.2; for now, we will use some of these terms when their meaning is clear.
In the classical HD game, when two hawks fight, each animal has an
equal chance of winning. The winner of the conflict obtains the full value of
the resource, and the loser pays some cost associated with fighting. Averag-
ing these two outcomes, Maynard Smith (1979) proposed that animals who
engage in a Hawk–Hawk encounter should each obtain the same expected
payoff. When the value of the resource is normalized to 1 and the cost of los-
ing a fight is c, the expected payoff for a Hawk–Hawk encounter is (1− c)/2.
Maynard Smith (1979) took these expected payoffs to be exact payoffs in a
single instance of a Hawk–Hawk encounter. In Figure 1, we show the classical
HD game in normal form.
There are various systems for classifying 2 × 2 games according to the
orders of the payoffs to the players (Robinson and Goforth, 2005; Bruns,
2015). For the classical HD game, the classification depends on the value of
c. When c > 1, such that fights cost more than the value of the resource,
the classical HD game is an example of the ‘Snowdrift’ game (also called
the ‘Chicken’ game1). When 0 < c < 1, the HD game is an example of
a ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ (PD). The case in which c = 1 is not an example
1Although the term ‘Chicken’ is used more widely than ‘Snowdrift’ (Robinson and
Goforth, 2005; Bruns, 2015), we use the latter to avoid any confusion between game-
classification terminology and actual chickens.
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Figure 1: Payoffs to animals A and B in a classical Hawk–Dove game where the value
of the resource is 1 and the cost of fighting is c. When c > 1, this is an example of a
Snowdrift game; when 0 < c < 1, this is an example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. (The
special case with c = 1 is not an ordinal game.)
of a strict ordinal game, because there are multiple ways in which a player
can obtain a payoff of 0. Such ‘games with ties’ (Bruns, 2015) are more
complicated to analyze than strict ordinal games and are unlikely to occur
in practice because they need model parameters to take precise values on the
boundary between different regimes. Throughout this paper, we concentrate
on strict ordinal games.
The classical HD game and the IPD game are both inadequate for de-
scribing social interactions between animals. One key issue is that both the
classical HD game and the IPD game assume that there are no differences in
the payoff matrices for the two animals; without modification, the classical
HD and IPD games cannot take into account the fact that one animal may
have a larger RHP than the other, or that one animal may place a higher
value on a disputed resource. A further issue is that neither the HD game
nor the IPD game include any element of assessment, where an animal uses
information about its opponent obtained from signals, resource ownership, or
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past experience to guide its behavior. This is an important issue to address,
as it is well-established that conditional strategies with assessment are far
better models of animal conflict than strategies that do not involve assess-
ment (Parker, 1974). Models such as Maynard Smith’s original HD game or
the IPD of Axelrod (1984) are thus very restricted in their application to real
animals.
In our model, we make three significant modifications to the classical HD
game:
1. We study an iterated game where each stage is a HD game.
2. We assume that there is always a winner and a loser in any Hawk–
Hawk interaction, rather than supposing that each animal obtains an
identical payoff (based on a mean over many fights).
3. We assume that Hawk–Hawk conflicts are biased in outcome, in that
one animal is more likely to win the fight than its opponent.
In Figure 2, we show our modified HD game in normal form. We briefly
discuss each of our modifications in turn.
Our first modification is to consider an iterated game in which each stage
is a HD game. Instead of considering a single conflict, we aim to model
repeated interactions of two animals who are part of the same social group.
We assume that each HD interaction is identical, such that animals do not
get stronger or weaker over time, and that the available resource has the
same value in each stage game.
In our second modification, we assume that each Hawk–Hawk interaction
has a winner and a loser. Instead of each animal receiving an identical payoff,
we assume that each Hawk–Hawk ‘fight’ results in one animal (the winner)
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Figure 2: Payoffs to animals A and B in one stage game of our modified Hawk–Dove
model. The value of the resource is 1. When both animals play Hawk, there is a fight that
is resolved probabilistically, such that the chance of animal A winning the fight is pA. The
winner obtains a payoff of 1− cW (the value of the resource minus the cost of fighting for
the winner), and the loser obtains −cL (a fixed penalty associated with losing fights).
receiving the full value of the resource (except for some cost associated with
fighting) and the other animal (the loser) receiving a cost for fighting and
none of the resource. Specifically, we assume that there is a cost cW > 0
associated with winning a fight and a cost cL > 0 associated with losing a
fight, such that the winner obtains a payoff of 1 − cW and the loser obtains
a payoff of −cL. We also assume that 1 − cW > −cL, so the payoff from
winning a fight is greater than the payoff from losing it.
In our third modification, we assume that the outcomes of Hawk–Hawk
conflicts are biased, so one animal is more likely to win the fight than its
opponent. Specifically, there is a fixed probability pA that animal A beats
animal B. Consequently, the expected payoff for animal A from a Hawk–
Hawk fight is pA(1− cW + cL)− cL, and the expected payoff for animal B is
1− cW − pA(1− cW + cL).
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Our modified HD model is controlled by three dimensionless parameters:
cW , cL, and pA. We assume that cW and cL are fixed for a given species, and
that the values of cW and cL are known a priori to both animals A and B.
By contrast, we assume that pA depends on the different fighting abilities (as
measured by RHP) of animals A and B. An animal with a larger RHP is
likely to beat an animal with a smaller RHP.
Let RA and RB, respectively, denote the RHPs of animals A and B. The
probability that A wins a fight is pA = ϕ(RA, RB), where ϕ(x, y) is some
function with the property that 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. We require that ϕx(x, y) > 0, so
that an increased RHP is associated with an increased chance of winning a
fight, and that ϕ(x, y) = 1−ϕ(y, x), so that the chance of winning a fight is
independent of whether an animal is labeled as A or B.
When RHPs are given by positive real numbers, a suitable and intuitive
f that satisfies the above conditions is
ϕ(RA, RB) =
RA
RA +RB
. (1)
This choice of ϕ enables further simplifications when studying RHPs that
we draw from some common probability distributions. For example, if we
draw the RHPs from an exponential distribution, the corresponding pA comes
from a uniform distribution. More generally, if we draw the RHPs from a
gamma distribution with shape parameter k (and any rate parameter), it
follows that pA ∼ Beta(k, k). In this paper, we draw pA from such a beta
distribution, and we assume that animals A and B have prior knowledge of
this distribution, even if they do not have specific knowledge of pA.
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2.2. Terminology and classification of strategies
For the rest of this paper, we will be concerned with comparing different
strategies for playing the iterated HD game that we defined in Section 2.1. It
will help our analysis and discussion to explicitly introduce some terminology.
Each interaction of animals A and B (where they play the ‘stage game’ in
Figure 2) is a ‘round’. In every round, each animal chooses a ‘move’, which
is either Hawk or Dove. Like Houston and McNamara (1991) but unlike
Mesterton-Gibbons et al. (2014), we consider Hawk and Dove to be the only
possible moves in each round. Our model does not include any concept
of resource ownership, and we do not consider Bourgeois or anti-Bourgeois
strategies. If a given round involves both animals choosing Hawk as their
move, we say that a ‘fight’ occurs.
The overall game, which consists of a large number of rounds, is a ‘contest’
between animals A and B. We use the payoffs from each round to calculate
the ‘total payoff’ to each animal at the end of the contest. Specifically, we
evaluate the total payoff to each animal by summing the discounted payoffs
to animals A and B over all rounds. Discounting entails that payoffs in early
rounds are worth more than those in later rounds. Taking γ ∈ (0, 1) to be
the discount rate and ρ
(A)
k to be the payoff to animal A in round j, the total
payoff to A at the end of the contest is
ϕA =
∞∑
j=1
γj−1ρ(A)j . (2)
Using a discount rate of γ is equivalent mathematically to calculating ex-
pected values for the total (undiscounted) payoff of a contest in which there
is a probability of 1− γ at the end of each round that it terminates at that
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point.
An animal’s ‘strategy’ in a contest is a set of rules that enable it to deter-
mine the moves that it plays in each round. In general, a strategy specifies
a move for the first round and a rule, based on the outcomes of the previ-
ous rounds, for determining which move to select in each subsequent round.
Strategies do not need to be deterministic; they can be probabilistic, in the
sense that a strategy can specify a probability between 0 and 1 of playing
Dove on a particular move. We distinguish between three types of strategies
depending on (1) whether or not an animal explicitly uses information about
its probability of winning fights to inform its behavior and on (2) whether or
not an animal begins the contest with knowledge of its probability of win-
ning fights. Animal A and animal B may each use different strategies (and
even different strategy types); for simplicity, we describe strategies from the
perspective of animal A.
The three strategy types are ‘simple’, ‘informed’, and ‘learning’. When
animal A pursues a simple strategy, it does not use knowledge of pA to
inform its behavior. When animal A pursues an informed strategy, it begins
a contest with perfect knowledge of pA and uses this information to guide
its behavior. Such a strategy is relevant only when an animal is both able
to assess its opponent perfectly without any fighting and able to exploit
that assessment in its behavioral choices. When animal A pursues a learning
strategy, it begins with limited information about pA, but it uses information
from fights to update its beliefs about pA and uses its beliefs about pA to
guide its choice of moves. In Table 1, we summarize the three strategy types.
In our analysis of simple strategies, we consider only ‘memory-1 strate-
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Strategy type
Uses information Available to animals Available to animals
about pA to with perfect knowledge with no knowledge
inform behavior of pA at start of contest of pA at start of contest
Simple No Yes Yes
Informed Yes Yes No
Learning Yes No Yes
Table 1: A summary of the three different strategy types. Because animals that pursue
simple strategies do not use pA to inform their behavior, simple strategies are always
available to animals, even if they begin a contest without knowledge of pA.
gies’ (Press and Dyson, 2012; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993b), in which the
probability of playing Dove (and thus also of playing Hawk) in any partic-
ular round depends only on the moves of the two animals in the previous
round. As we discuss in more detail in Section 3.2, one can represent simple
memory-1 strategies using s, a vector of values between 0 and 1; each of
these values represents the probability of playing Dove in a particular sit-
uation based on the outcome of the previous round (Nowak and Sigmund,
1993b; Press and Dyson, 2012). Although our focus on memory-1 strategies
places some restrictions on the variety of simple strategies that we can con-
sider, many important strategies — including Tit for Tat (Axelrod, 1984),
Grim Trigger (Friedman, 1971) (which we call ‘Grim’), Pavlov (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1993b), and extortionate strategies (Press and Dyson, 2012) — are
examples of memory-1 strategies.
Our analysis of informed and learning strategies also focuses on memory-
1 strategies. For an informed memory-1 strategy, the probability of playing
Dove in a given round depends both on pA and on the moves from the previous
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round. That is, an informed memory-1 strategy is one in which an animal uses
knowledge of pA to choose an element from a set of memory-1 ‘substrategies’,
where one can represent each substrategy in the standard vector format of
a simple strategy (see Section 3.2). For a learning memory-1 strategy, the
probability of playing Dove in a given round depends both on an animal’s
current beliefs about pA and on the moves from the previous round. That
is, the results of all previous fights inform an animal’s beliefs about pA,
and it uses these beliefs to determine the substrategy that it employs in any
particular round. An animal that pursues a learning memory-1 strategy does
use information from rounds before the previous one to decide its move, but
it does so only via the influence that these earlier rounds have on the animal’s
beliefs about pA.
An animal needs a learning strategy only if it does not begin with perfect
information about pA. Therefore, we also distinguish between (1) animals
that begin a contest with perfect knowledge of pA and (2) animals that begin
a contest with information about the distribution of RHPs (and hence the
probability distribution from which we draw pA), but not of pA itself. An
animal with knowledge of pA is able to use a simple strategy or an informed
strategy, whereas an animal without this knowledge can use either a simple
strategy or a learning strategy. Determining optimal strategies for animals
with knowledge of pA is the focus of Section 3, and determining optimal
strategies for animals without prior knowledge of pA is the focus of Section
4.
Even with significant restrictions (e.g., considering only simple memory-1
strategies), the set of possible strategies for this game is infinite, and the game
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that we are examining is an example of a long, repeated game. There are well-
established difficulties associated with defining a ‘good’ strategy in classical
game-theoretic terms (Fujiwara-Greve, 2015). For discount rates that are
sufficiently close to 1, some so-called ‘folk theorems’ guarantee that there
is a very large class of strategies that are subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
(Friedman, 1971; Fujiwara-Greve, 2015).
Our approach for assessing the success of a strategy is analogous to the
methods proposed in Maynard Smith and Price (1973) to compare strategies
for a single multi-stage conflict between two animals. Maynard Smith and
Price (1973) defined their game and then proposed a set of plausible strate-
gies that animals can use. They then considered every possible pair of these
strategies and ran simulations to examine outcomes of fights between animals
that adopt these strategies. Because these simulations involve a random ele-
ment, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) ran multiple simulations for each pair
of strategies and reported the mean payoff for each animal. They presented
these results as a matrix of mean payoffs to each animal that are associated
with the different strategy pairs of combatant animals, and Maynard Smith
and Price (1973) then determined which strategies are evolutionarily sta-
ble to invasion from the other strategies. An ‘evolutionary stable strategy’
(ESS) is based on the following idea: if all members of a population adopt
an ESS (which can differ across animals, given the asymmetric nature of the
contests), then a mutant strategy cannot successfully invade the population
Maynard Smith (1982).
In mathematical terms, let E(T, S) represent the expected payoff to an-
imal A when animal A pursues strategy T and animal B pursues strategy
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S. A strategy S is a ‘strong ESS’ if E(T, S) < E(S, S) for all strategies
T 6= S. Therefore, if all members of a population are using a strong ESS S
and a mutant uses strategy T , the mutant will be less successful than the
original population. A strategy S is a ‘weak ESS’ if E(T, S) ≤ E(S, S) for all
strategies T 6= S and E(S, S) > E(T, T ) whenever E(T, S) = E(S, S). Not
all games have ESSs, and sometimes multiple different strategies (or proba-
bilistic combinations of strategies) can be ESSs (Maynard Smith and Price,
1973; Fujiwara-Greve, 2015).
In our investigation, we take Maynard Smith and Price (1973)’s approach:
we consider a limited set of plausible strategies and use simulations to identify
ESSs. We are concerned particularly with identifying strategies that are
effective regardless of RHP. Consequently, we calculate the mean payoff of
a given strategy against another given strategy as the mean over a large
number of simulations using different values of pA. Following Axelrod and
Hamilton (1981), we refer to the large collection of such contests of a set of
strategies as a ‘tournament’ between these strategies. From the perspective of
evolutionary game theory, our approach entails seeking ESSs when strategy
is heritable but RHP is not.
2.3. A Bayesian approach to learning
An animal that pursues a learning strategy begins a contest with full
knowledge of cW and cL, but with no information about pA beyond the fact
that pA ∼ Beta(k, k) for a specified k. The animal uses information from
its interactions with its opponent to improve its estimate of pA. Various
methods have been developed for implementing learning in repeated games
with incomplete information (Aumann and Maschler, 1995; Sastry et al.,
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1994; Watkins and Dayan, 1992; Jordan, 1995). Many of these approaches are
very general and sophisticated, but they depend on the assumption that each
player is rational. By exploiting the assumed rationality of their opponent, a
player that uses these methods can obtain information about the parameters
of the game after each round.
In the present work, by contrast, we use a Bayesian approach to incor-
porate the information obtained from fights into an animal’s beliefs about
pA, and we assume that its beliefs about pA do not change if there is no
fight. This approach does not require the assumption that all animals be-
have rationally. Because we assume that pA remains constant over time, we
can treat fights as independent Bernoulli trials with a fixed probability of
success. It is then straightforward to use Bayes’ rule to update estimates
of pA as an animal acquires information from the outcomes of fights (Gel-
man et al., 2004). Because the beta distribution is a conjugate prior of the
Bernoulli distribution, it follows that if one can represent an animal’s initial
beliefs about its probability of winning a fight using a beta distribution, then
these beliefs remain a beta distribution (but with altered parameter values)
as an animal obtains information from the outcomes of fights (Gelman et al.,
2004; Trimmer et al., 2011).
There has been some discussion in the biological literature about whether
animals (including humans) are capable of Bayesian updating (Trimmer
et al., 2011; Valone, 2006; McNamara et al., 2006). The consensus of such
work is that observations of vertebrate behavior (especially with foraging)
are consistent with Bayesian updating. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to
suppose in our model that animals use Bayesian updating to inform their
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strategic choices in a conflict over resources.
The main challenges associated with taking a Bayesian approach are de-
termining the parameters to use in the prior distribution and deciding how
animals should use their current estimate of the pA distribution to inform
their behavior. In Section 4, we propose and compare a range of learning
strategies that uninformed animals can use to assess their probability of win-
ning a fight, and we discuss how this information influences which strategy
they adopt.
3. Analysis of strategies for animals with knowledge of pA
To understand learning strategies, we first examine informed strategies.
Informed strategies are themselves interesting, especially when cost-free or
low-cost observations are reliable indicators of RHP.
We investigate the quality of different informed strategies, and we com-
pare informed strategies with standard simple strategies. Intuitively, we ex-
pect that good learning strategies will (with high probability) lead to animals
pursuing a good informed strategy in the long term. To construct such learn-
ing strategies, it is first necessary to determine what constitute good informed
strategies.
3.1. Stage-game classification and its implications
Suppose that two animals are playing against each other in the modified
HD game of Figure 2, with pA known to both animals. Replacing the random
outcome of a fight with the expected value of the interaction, we obtain the
game in Figure 3, where the expected payoffs µA and µB to animals A and
18
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Figure 3: Expected values of the payoffs to animals A and B in a single round of our
modified Hawk–Dove game. We give the expected payoffs from fighting, µA and µB , in
equations (3) and (4). The character of the game (and the corresponding best strategies)
depend on the values of µA and µB .
B when they both play Hawk are
µA = −cL + pA(1− cW + cL) , (3)
µB = 1− cW − pA(1− cW + cL) . (4)
The optimal strategies for informed animals A and B in an iterated game
depend on the ordering of the payoffs associated with the different interac-
tions in the stage game; these, in turn, depend on the values of µA and µB.
The stage-game payoffs associated with Dove–Dove and Hawk–Dove plays
by the animals are (1
2
, 1
2
) and (1, 0), respectively. We can thus classify the
different stage games according to the sizes of µA and µB relative to each
other and to 0, 1
2
, and 1. Because µA < 1, µB < 1, and µA + µB < 1, there
are 10 possible orderings of the payoffs. Assuming without loss of generality
that µA > µB, we enumerate the 5 remaining orderings in Table 2. We obtain
the other 5 orderings by swapping µA and µB.
As one can see in Table 2, we refer to the different classifications of the
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stage game by names based on the ordering of payoffs to animals A and
B. Therefore, if animal A is faced with a ‘Snowdrift’ situation (in which
its expected payoff for a fight is negative) and animal B is faced with a
‘Deadlock’ situation (in which its expected payoff for a fight is more than 1
2
),
we have a ‘Snowdrift–Deadlock’ game.
All possible stage games other than the Snowdrift game have a unique
Nash equilibrium. In the Snowdrift game, for which µB and µA are both
negative, there are three Nash equilibria: (Hawk, Dove), (Dove, Hawk), and
a mixed Nash equilibrium in which animal A plays Dove with probability
2|µA|/(1+2|µA|) and animal B plays Dove with probability 2|µB|/(1+2|µB|).
Ordering Name Nash Equilibria
µB < µA < 0 <
1
2
< 1 Snowdrift (A beats B) (D,H), (H,D), or mixed
µB < 0 < µA <
1
2
< 1 PD–Snowdrift (H,D)
µB < 0 <
1
2
< µA < 1 Deadlock–Snowdrift (H,D)
0 < µB < µA <
1
2
< 1 PD (A beats B) (H,H)
0 < µB <
1
2
< µA < 1 Deadlock–PD (H,H)
Table 2: Classification of the stage game according to the values of µA and µB , with
µA > µB . We base the nomenclature on the ordering of payoffs to each of the animals.
For example, a ‘PD–Snowdrift’ game is one in which the ordering of payoffs to animal
A is identical to that in the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game, whereas the ordering of
payoffs to animal B is identical to that in the classical Snowdrift game. The mixed Nash
equilibrium for the Snowdrift game occurs when animal A plays Dove with probability
2|µA|/(1 + 2|µA|) and animal B plays Dove with probability 2|µB |/(1 + 2|µB |).
One can also understand the different classifications of the stage game
as corresponding to different regions in (µA, µB)-space, as we illustrate in
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Figure 4. For fixed cW and cL, changing pA leads to changes in µA and µB,
which in turn correspond to changes in the classification of the stage game.
In general, a fixed choice of cW and cL defines a unique line segment in Figure
4 that connects (−cL, 1−cW ) to (1−cW ,−cL). All such line segments have a
slope of −1 in (µA, µB)-space. Additionally, the center of each line segment
is located at the point at which µA = µB =
1
2
(1− cW − cL); this occurs when
pA =
1
2
. The blue lines in Figure 4 show three examples for different values
of the parameters cW and cL. As one increases pA, one moves along such a
line in Figure 4 from the top left to the bottom right.
As we can see from the example lines in Figure 4, the sequence of stage
games as pA increases from 0 to 1 depends on the values of cW and cL. Recall
from Section 2.1 that cW and cL must both be positive (so that fighting is
costly) and that 1 − cW > −cL (so that the payoff to the winner of a fight
is greater than the payoff to the loser). Considering all allowable possibili-
ties in (cW , cL)-space, we find that there are six different parameter regimes
associated with different sequences of stage-game classifications. We show
the parameter regimes in Figure 5, and we detail the associated sequences of
stage-game classifications in Table 3.
Parameter regimes IV, V, and VI are associated with a narrower range of
stage games than parameter regimes I, II, and III. Specifically, from Table 3,
we see that the stage-game classifications that occur in parameter regime IV
as we change pA from 0 to
1
2
are a subset of those that occur in parameter
regime II for the same range of values of pA. In both parameter regime II and
parameter regime IV, there is a transition from Snowdrift–PD to PD as pA
passes through cL/q. However, in regime II, there is an additional transition
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Figure 4: The classification of the stage game depends on µA and µB , which are the
expected payoffs associated with fighting for animals A and B, respectively. We mark the
case with pA = 0.5 (in which the animals are evenly matched) with a dashed line, and we
separate the different stage-game classifications with solid lines. We shade the region that
is inaccessible when cL and cW are positive. We abbreviate ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ as PD
in the figure. In addition to the stage-game classifications that we label in the diagram,
(a) designates a Prisoner’s Dilemma–Deadlock game, (b) designates Deadlock–Prisoner’s
Dilemma, (c) designates Prisoner’s Dilemma–Snowdrift, and (d) designates Deadlock–
Snowdrift. As pA changes, the classification of the stage game changes. The blue lines show
the possible values of µA and µB that are associated with varying pA for three different
choices of fixed cW and cL. From left to right, the blue lines show (cW , cL) = (0.1, 1.2),
(cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.6), and (cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.2). As pA increases from 0 to 1, one moves
from the top left to the bottom right. Each of these lines is associated with a different
sequence of stage games as one increases pA from 0 to 1.
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from Snowdrift–Deadlock to Snowdrift–PD as pA passes through (
1
2
− cW )/q;
this transition does not occur in regime IV, as (1
2
− cW )/q < 0 in this case.
Therefore, there are stage-game classifications that can occur in parameter
regime II that are not possible in parameter regime IV. Similarly, the stage-
game classifications that occur for pA ∈ [0, 1/2] in parameter regime V are
a subset of those that occur for pA ∈ [0, 1/2] in parameter regime III; and
the stage-game classifications for pA ∈ [0, 1/2] in parameter regime VI are a
subset of those for pA ∈ [0, 1/2] in parameter regime V (and therefore also a
subset of those for pA ∈ [0, 1/2] in parameter III). This is a consequence of
the fact that all choices of cW and cL correspond to line segments in (µA, µB)-
space with slope −1 that are centered on a point at which µA = µB. If we
change cW and cL so that we decrease cW while fixing cW + cL, the new line
segment becomes a subset of the previous line segment. This occurs at the
boundaries between parameter regimes II and IV, III and V, and V and VI.
Because we expect an optimal choice of strategy to depend on the stage-
game classification, we anticipate observing a more complicated dependence
of optimal strategy on pA in regimes I, II, and III than in regimes IV, V, and
VI. To focus on cases in which optimal strategy can vary significantly as pA
changes, we concentrate our analysis on parameter regimes I, II, and III.
3.2. Defining informed strategies
We examine seven informed strategies, which we detail below. We build
these informed strategies from Hawk, Dove, and Tit for Tat substrategies;
we base the choice between these substrategies on the stage game.
We define informed strategies for an iterated game in which both animals
know pA (and hence also know µA and µB). We consider seven informed
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c W
Figure 5: As pA changes, the classification of the stage game changes. We show the differ-
ent regimes in (cW ,cL)-space that lead to different sequences of stage-game classifications.
We shade the region that is inaccessible due to the requirement that 1 − cW > −cL. We
outline the stage games of the different regimes in Table 3, and one can also see them in
Figure 4.
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strategies, which we call ‘Bully’, ‘Nash’, ‘Mixed Nash’, ‘Selfish’, ‘Snowdrift
TfT’, ‘PD TfT’, and ‘Informed TfT’. In Table 4, we describe the substrate-
gies that are pursued by these informed strategies for different stage games.
Supposing that animal A is the one that is playing the strategy and that
animal B is its opponent, we summarize the seven informed strategies as
follows:
• ‘Bully’ always plays Hawk if pA > 12 (i.e., when it is more likely than
not to beat its opponent) and always plays Dove if pA <
1
2
.
• ‘Nash’ pursues a Nash-equilibrium substrategy at each move. In a
Snowdrift game, ‘Nash’ uses the difference in RHP to decide which
pure Nash equilibrium to pursue; it always plays Hawk if pA >
1
2
and
always plays Dove if pA <
1
2
.
• ‘Mixed Nash’ pursues a Nash-equilibrium substrategy at each move. In
a Snowdrift game, ‘Mixed Nash’ pursues a mixed substrategy in which
its probability of playing Dove is 2|µA|/(1 + 2|µA|).
• ‘Selfish’ chooses a substrategy based on its expected payoff from a fight.
It always plays Hawk if µA >
1
2
, pursues a Tit for Tat substrategy if
0 < µA <
1
2
, and always plays Dove if µA < 0.
• ‘Snowdrift TfT’ pursues a Tit for Tat substrategy when the stage game
is Snowdrift or Snowdrift–PD, but it otherwise follows the Nash equi-
librium.
• ‘PD TfT’ pursues a Tit for Tat substrategy when the stage game is PD
or PD–Deadlock, but it otherwise follows the Nash equilibrium.
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• ‘Informed TfT’ pursues a Tit for Tat substrategy, except when this is
clearly unsuitable. Specifically, ‘Informed TfT’ always plays Hawk in
a Deadlock–Snowdrift or Deadlock–PD stage game and always plays
Dove in a Snowdrift–Deadlock stage game, but it otherwise pursues
Tit for Tat.
We do not specify substrategies when the value of pA implies that µA and
µB are at a ‘critical’ threshold value (i.e., a bifurcation) between two types
of stage games, as the probability that two animals have identical RHPs
(or of the expected payoff from a fight being precisely 0 or precisely 1
2
) is
0. In our numerical computations that pit strategies against each other,
we choose random values of pA from a symmetric beta distribution, so it is
extremely unlikely that any of the critical situations occur. In the current
form of our code, for any critical case (i.e., on the boundary between two
types of stage games), an animal chooses the most aggressive of the two (or
more) substrategies from the adjacent regions; that is, an animal chooses
the strategy that it would pursue if its RHP is larger by an arbitrarily small
amount for a fixed value of its opponent’s RHP. The code also returns a
warning in such a critical case; no such warning occurred in any of our
tournaments.
We now discuss our motivation behind the above strategies. One ap-
proach that the animals can take is to pursue a Nash-equilibrium strategy
of the stage game in each round. This involves a small complication for
the Snowdrift game (where there are three Nash equilibria), but otherwise
this gives a unique strategy for each animal to pursue in each round. How-
ever, pursuing the stage-game Nash equilibrium in each round of an iterated
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game is not necessarily optimal. The most famous example comes from the
work by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) on the IPD. For a classical PD stage
game, where both players obtain the same payoff if they both defect, the
unique Nash equilibrium is for both players to defect (or, in the terminology
of our HD game, for both animals to play Hawk). Nevertheless, coopera-
tive strategies, such as Tit for Tat and Grim (in which each animal plays
Dove until the opposing animal has played Hawk), can still be very success-
ful (Fujiwara-Greve, 2015). In Axelrod and Hamilton’s tournament, Tit for
Tat was the most successful strategy, and both Tit for Tat and Grim can be
evolutionary stable (except to invasion from other cooperative strategies) for
sufficiently large values of the discount parameter γ (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Fujiwara-Greve, 2015).
If animal A knows the classification (i.e., the relative values of the param-
eters) of the stage game that it is playing (see Table 2), only a limited range
of strategies are plausible for the iterated game. For example, if animal A is
playing an iterated Deadlock–PD or Deadlock–Snowdrift game, its best strat-
egy is to always play Hawk, regardless of the choice of animal B. This is not
simply the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, but instead the unambigu-
ous optimal strategy for the iterated game, because the expected payoff to
animal A from a Hawk–Hawk encounter is larger than what it would obtain
from a Dove–Dove encounter. Therefore, Hawk strictly dominates Dove.
Now consider animalB’s best strategy in a Deadlock–Snowdrift or Deadlock–
PD game. Because animal A always plays Hawk if playing rationally and B’s
best response to Hawk is Dove, there is no reason for animal B to pursue
a Tit for Tat strategy to encourage animal A to play Dove. If animal B
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pursues Tit for Tat, it can end up in fights, which are more costly to animal
B than playing Dove against A’s Hawk. Animal B’s best response to A’s
Hawk when the stage game is Deadlock–PD is also to play Hawk, because
animal B’s expected payoff from a fight is positive. Moreover, animal B’s
payoff is even larger if it can compel animal A to play Dove, as is the case,
for example, if animal B pursues a Tit for Tat strategy. If animal A pursues
Tit for Tat in a Deadlock–PD game (possibly because it does not know pA
or is not exploiting that information), the best response from B is to pursue
a Tit for Tat strategy. Even if animal A were pursuing the rational choice
of always playing Hawk (the ‘Always Hawk’ strategy), there is only a small
difference in payoff to animal B (associated with the first round) if it pur-
sues Tit for Tat instead of its optimal response of Always Hawk. Therefore,
although a quantitative study is necessary to make a definitive statement
about the comparative performances of the different substrategies, the above
discussion indicates that a good strategy for animal B in a Deadlock–PD
game is to play Tit for Tat.
The possible ambiguity of each animal’s optimal strategy is even more
complicated for a PD game or a game that involves some combination of PD
and Snowdrift. For simplicity, we assume for each type of stage game that
an informed animal pursues one of four different ‘substrategies’: (i) always
play Hawk, (ii) always play Dove, (iii) play Tit for Tat, or (iv) play a mixed
Hawk–Dove strategy. For a given type of stage game, only a strict subset of
these strategies is going to be a reasonable choice for a rational animal. For
example, the mixed Hawk–Dove strategy can be a Nash equilibrium only for
a Snowdrift game, and the only rational strategies for informed animals in
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a Deadlock–Snowdrift game are for animal A to play Always Hawk and for
animal B to always play Dove (i.e., to play ‘Always Dove’).
3.3. Tournaments for comparing informed strategies
We use tournaments, which consist of many contents between different
pairs of strategies, to compare the performance of seven informed strategies
against each other and against nine simple memory-1 strategies (which do
not take advantage of the information available from pA). We represent
each simple memory-1 strategy using s, a vector of six probabilities. The
first five elements give the probabilities of an animal playing Dove when the
previous moves by it and its opponent are Dove–Dove, Dove–Hawk, Hawk–
Dove, Hawk–Hawk (and the animal loses), and Hawk–Hawk (and the animal
wins); and the sixth element gives the probability of the animal playing Dove
on its first move. The vector s is comparable to the strategy vectors in Nowak
and Sigmund (1993b) and Press and Dyson (2012).
We consider the following memory-1 strategies: Always Dove, 25% Dove,
50% Dove, 75% Dove, Always Hawk, Tit for Tat (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981), Grim (Friedman, 1971), Pavlov (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993b), and
Modified Pavlov. In Table 5, we summarize the probabilities of playing Dove
(the components of s) that are associated with these strategies in different
circumstances. The probability of playing Hawk in each circumstance is
the complement of the probability of playing Dove. An animal that plays
Pavlov plays Dove with very high probability (which we take to be 0.99 in our
tournaments) in response to a previous (Dove, Dove) or (Hawk, Hawk) round
(and otherwise it plays Hawk); and it plays Hawk with very high probability
(again 0.99) in response to a previous (Hawk, Dove) or (Dove, Hawk) round.
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Modified Pavlov follows the same ‘win–stay, lose–shift’ philosophy of Pavlov
(see Nowak and Sigmund (1993b)), but instead of treating ‘Hawk–Hawk’ as
a loss in all circumstances (as in the original Pavlov), Modified Pavlov treats
‘Hawk–Hawk’ as a loss only if the associated fight is a loss. Additionally,
following Nowak and Sigmund (1993b), we take the probabilities of playing
Hawk and Dove in a Pavlov strategy to be close to 0 and 1 (rather than
exactly 0 and 1).
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Regime Range of pA values Classification
I 0 < pA < cL/q Snowdrift–Deadlock
cL/q < pA < (
1
2
− cW )/q PD–Deadlock
(1
2
− cW )/q < pA < 12 PD (B beats A)
II 0 < pA < (
1
2
− cW )/q Snowdrift–Deadlock
(1
2
− cW )/q < pA < cL/q Snowdrift–PD
cL/q < pA <
1
2
PD (B beats A)
III 0 < pA < (
1
2
− cW )/q Snowdrift–Deadlock
(1
2
− cW )/q < pA < (1− cW )/q Snowdrift–PD
(1− cW )/q < pA < 12 Snowdrift (B beats A)
IV 0 < pA < cL/q Snowdrift–PD
cL/q < pA <
1
2
PD (B beats A)
V 0 < pA < (1− cW )/q Snowdrift–PD
(1− cW )/q < pA < 12 Snowdrift (B beats A)
VI 0 < pA <
1
2
Snowdrift (B beats A)
Table 3: Changes to the classification of the stage game as pA increases from 0 to
1
2
in each of the parameter regimes from Figure 5. For convenience, we define the notation
q = 1−cW +cL. We obtain the classifications of the stage game for pA > 12 from symmetry.
For pA =
1
2 , animals A and B are evenly matched, and the game is a classical Prisoner’s
Dilemma (in regimes I, II, and IV) or Snowdrift game (in regimes III, V, and VI), where
both animals have the same expected payoff from a fight. In our numerical experiments,
we concentrate on examples with cW <
1
2 , so we are in one of regimes I–III.
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Stage game Bul N MN Slf SDT PDT InT
Deadlock–Snowdrift H H H H H H H
Deadlock–PD H H H H H H H
PD–Snowdrift H H H TfT H H TfT
PD (A beats B) H H H TfT H TfT TfT
PD (B beats A) D H H TfT H TfT TfT
PD–Deadlock D H H TfT H TfT TfT
Snowdrift (A beats B) H H Mix D TfT H TfT
Snowdrift (B beats A) D D Mix D TfT D TfT
Snowdrift–PD D D D D TfT D TfT
Snowdrift–Deadlock D D D D D D D
Table 4: Summary of substrategies for animal A playing each of our informed strategies:
Bully (‘Bul’), Nash (‘N’), Mixed Nash (‘MN’), Selfish (‘Slf’), Snowdrift TfT (‘SDT’), PD
TfT (‘PDT’), and Informed TfT (‘InT’). The entries in the table indicate the substrategy
that is pursued by animal A when the stage-game classification is the one in the left
column. The strategies in the table are Hawk (‘H’), Dove (‘D’), Tit for Tat (‘TfT’), and
mixed substrategies (‘Mix’). See the text for details.
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Probability of playing Dove (otherwise playing Hawk)
Strategy name After DD After DH After HD After HH (loss) After HH (win) On first move
Always Hawk 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% Dove 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
50% Dove 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
75% Dove 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Always Dove 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tit for Tat 1 0 1 0 0 1
Grim 1 0 0 0 0 1
Pavlov 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.5
Modified Pavlov 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.5
Table 5: The memory-1 strategies that we consider. Each row gives the components of s that are associated with the specified
memory-1 strategy. We show the probabilities that an animal plays Dove (otherwise, it plays Hawk) after different move pairs
from it and its opponent (listed in that order) in the previous round. We abbreviate Dove as ‘D’ and Hawk as ‘H’, so the
numbers in the ‘After DH’ column give the probability of playing Dove when the animal played Dove and its opponent played
Hawk in the previous round. The final column gives the probability that an animal plays Dove in the first round.
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In each tournament, we specify the parameters that are associated with
the cost of fighting (cW and cL), the discount rate (γ), and the shape pa-
rameter of the symmetric beta distribution of win probabilities (k) at the
outset, and we keep them fixed throughout the tournament. In all of our
tournaments in this paper, we take cW = 0.1, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. In
this section, we describe the results of three tournaments with three differ-
ent values of cL (0.2, 0.6, and 1.2). Combined with taking cW = 0.1, these
values of cL correspond to different parameter regimes (see Section 3.1), as
we illustrate in Figure 4. Specifically, (cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.2) corresponds to
regime I, (cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.6) corresponds to regime II, and (cW , cL) =
(0.1, 1.2) corresponds to regime III. Our code (in Matlab) for running
our tournaments is available at https://bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/
dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/, and we encourage readers to try
their own experiments.
Our parameter choices and the probability distribution from which we
select pA (i.e., the probability that animal A wins a fight) deserve some dis-
cussion. Taking k = 1 corresponds to choosing values of pA from a uniform
distribution between 0 and 1. We also perform numerical simulations using
the arcsine distribution pA ∼ Beta(12 , 12) and using a unimodal beta distribu-
tion with a reasonably large variance by taking pA ∼ Beta(2, 2). We obtain
qualitatively similar results for all three of these choices.
We choose the discount rate γ to be close to 1 so that the overall payoff
from a contest between a pair of animals is not dominated by payoffs from the
first few rounds. Taking γ to be close to 1 necessitates using a large number
of rounds in each contest to minimize numerical error from the finite nature
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of the contest. In our simulations, each contest consists of 1000 rounds.
Because we take γ = 0.995 and the maximum payoff from each round is 1,
the overall payoffs from our simulations are no more than γ
1000
1−γ ≈ 1.33 less
than what they would be for contests with infinitely many rounds. Similarly,
the minimum payoff from each round is −cL, so the overall payoffs from the
simulations are no more than cL
γ1000
1−γ ≈ 1.33cL larger than those for a game
with infinitely many rounds.
The aim of a tournament is to consider all possible strategy pairs and
use simulations to investigate their performance against each other for a
variety of values of pA. With 16 different strategies (seven informed ones and
nine simple ones), we anticipate a tournament to consist of 256 strategy-pair
comparisons. In practice, however, we can reduce the number of strategy-
pair comparisons because certain informed strategies are identical in some
parameter regimes. For example, the ‘Bully’ strategy and the ‘Nash’ strategy
are identical except when the stage game is PD or PD–Deadlock. Because
neither of these stage games occur in parameter regime III, the ‘Bully’ and
‘Nash’ strategies correspond to identical behaviors in this parameter regime,
so we can combine them. In our results (see Tables 6, 7, and 8), we indicate
where we combine informed strategies that are identical in a given parameter
regime.
We perform strategy-pair comparisons by assigning one strategy to animal
A and the other strategy to animal B and then calculating the mean payoff
to animal A from a large number of simulations (using a wide range of values
of different pA). The resulting mean payoff to animal A is an approximation
of the expected payoff to animal A that is associated with the given strategy
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pair.
To maximize the accuracy of our approximations of expected payoffs and
ensure that it is reasonable to compare them between strategy pairs, we em-
ploy variance-reduction techniques that are common in Monte Carlo methods
(Owen, 2018). Specifically, we begin each tournament by generating a set of
values for pA, the probability that animal A wins a fight; and we use the same
set of values of pA for each strategy-pair comparison. This is equivalent to
using the method of common numbers for variance reduction (Owen, 2018),
and it increases the likelihood that the differences between mean payoffs
that we calculate for different strategy pairs are the result of differences in
the expected payoffs for the strategy pairs rather, than from random fluctua-
tions. We also use the method of antithetic sampling (Owen, 2018), another
variance-reduction technique, to minimize any bias in favor of animal A or
animal B in the calculated mean payoffs. We implement the method of an-
tithetic sampling by ensuring, for each value of pA in our simulations, that
we also use its complement 1− pA as a value for pA.
In the tournaments that we discuss in our paper, we draw 250 values for
pA from the uniform distribution U(0, 1) = Beta(1, 1), and we then gener-
ate an additional 250 values of pA by taking the complements of the first
set of values. For each strategy-pair comparison, we run 20 contests with
each of the 500 values of pA. This gives a total of 10, 000 contests for each
strategy comparison; we report the mean payoff to animal A from these
10, 000 contests in our results. The purpose of performing multiple contests
with each value of pA is to reduce the noise in our plots of mean payoff as
a function of pA. (We do not show these plots in this paper, but one can
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generate them using the code at https://bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/
dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/.)
In Tables 6, 7, and 8, we describe our results for simulations in parameter
regimes I, II, and III, respectively. In these tables, we show the mean payoff
to animal A when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues
the strategy in the column. We use this information to calculate ESSs. Let
E(S, T ) denote the overall payoff to animal A when it pursues strategy S
and animal B pursues strategy T .
To make ESSs easier to identify, we color the cells in Tables 6, 7, and
8 based on the value of E(T, S) − E(S, S). We show cells as red when
E(T, S)−E(S, S) > 0 and blue when E(T, S)−E(S, S) < 0; deeper shades
correspond to larger differences. A red cell indicates that the strategy in the
row is able to invade the strategy in the column. If a strategy is a strong
ESS, all cells in the corresponding column are blue, except for the one on the
main diagonal.
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A B C D E F G H I J K L
(A) AllH 69.5 101.8 134.1 166.4 198.7 70.1 70.2 134.2 102.2 108.3 75.5 75.8
(B) 25%D 52.2 82.6 113.0 143.4 173.8 83.0 53.0 113.0 84.6 93.7 60.5 73.7
(C) 50%D 34.8 63.3 91.9 120.4 149.0 92.2 35.9 91.9 67.3 79.0 45.5 71.2
(D) 75%D 17.4 44.1 70.8 97.5 124.2 97.6 19.5 70.8 50.2 64.3 30.4 67.9
(E) AllH 0.0 24.8 49.7 74.5 99.3 99.3 99.3 49.8 49.6 49.7 15.3 64.2
(F) TfT 69.2 82.3 91.6 97.4 99.3 99.3 99.3 92.3 79.2 58.7 60.1 65.0
(G) Grim 69.3 101.3 133.2 164.6 99.3 99.3 99.3 127.6 101.2 58.7 60.0 65.0
(H) Pav 34.7 63.3 91.9 120.4 148.7 92.8 46.3 98.6 90.2 79.2 45.5 71.3
(I) MPav 55.5 83.3 111.1 138.5 149.0 96.0 63.6 104.6 87.5 80.6 56.0 71.7
(J) Bul 60.5 82.6 104.8 126.9 149.0 110.4 110.4 104.5 101.0 99.3 66.6 81.3
(K) N, MN, SDT 72.7 100.3 128.1 155.7 183.4 88.5 88.4 127.8 110.2 111.5 78.7 79.0
(L) Slf, PDT, InT 72.5 92.6 109.7 123.6 134.5 112.6 112.6 110.2 103.2 97.0 78.6 87.5
Table 6: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime I when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues
the strategy in the column. Our parameter values are cW = 0.1, cL = 0.2, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according
to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S) − E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the
row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue
when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when
10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2. The column strategies correspond to the row strategies
with the same letter. We assign a common letter to strategies that are identical in parameter regime I. We abbreviate strategies
as follows: AllH = Always Hawk; X%D = X% Dove and otherwise Hawk; AllD = Always Dove; TfT = Tit for Tat; Pav =
Pavlov; MPav = Modified Pavlov; Bul = Bully; N = Nash; PDT = PD Tit for Tat; MN = Mixed Nash; Slf = Selfish; SDT =
Snowdrift Tit for Tat; and InT = Informed Tit for Tat.
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
(A) AllH 29.7 72.0 114.2 156.4 198.7 30.6 30.7 114.2 70.8 77.4 62.5 62.9 43.2 62.7 43.7
(B) 25%D 22.4 60.2 98.1 136.0 173.8 60.7 23.3 98.1 60.9 70.5 56.9 71.9 43.1 64.3 58.1
(C) 50%D 14.9 48.4 81.9 115.5 149.0 82.3 16.3 81.9 51.3 63.5 51.3 77.0 42.6 64.3 68.2
(D) 75%D 7.5 36.7 65.7 95.0 124.2 95.2 9.7 66.0 42.2 56.6 45.7 78.1 41.6 62.6 73.9
(E) AllH 0.0 24.8 49.7 74.5 99.3 99.3 99.3 49.5 49.7 49.7 40.1 75.1 40.1 59.2 75.1
(F) TfT 29.7 60.1 81.8 94.9 99.3 99.3 99.3 83.3 58.8 27.8 22.5 54.7 22.6 35.9 54.7
(G) Grim 29.6 71.7 113.7 154.8 99.3 99.3 99.3 111.1 75.5 27.9 22.5 54.7 22.5 35.9 54.7
(H) Pav 14.9 48.4 82.0 115.5 148.8 83.5 29.7 97.7 84.9 63.2 51.1 77.7 42.7 64.4 68.9
(I) MPav 32.0 66.0 99.5 132.9 148.9 84.0 44.3 103.7 72.0 62.8 51.7 74.3 42.2 61.9 64.6
(J) Bul 51.7 76.0 100.3 124.6 149.0 101.6 101.6 100.2 95.7 99.3 84.5 110.0 65.2 94.1 90.7
(K) N, MN 53.2 79.6 105.9 132.2 158.5 93.8 93.7 106.0 97.8 100.8 86.0 102.0 66.7 86.1 82.8
(L) Slf 53.1 73.8 92.5 109.1 123.6 110.2 110.2 93.0 90.5 75.4 70.0 99.3 70.1 83.4 99.3
(M) SDT 50.4 81.0 109.1 135.0 158.5 93.7 93.6 109.3 97.6 98.0 83.1 102.0 63.9 83.3 82.7
(N) PDT 53.1 77.3 99.7 120.4 139.5 106.9 106.9 99.9 95.6 91.3 85.9 115.2 66.7 99.3 96.0
(O) InT 50.2 75.3 95.8 111.9 123.6 110.2 110.2 96.6 90.1 72.5 67.2 99.3 67.2 80.6 99.3
Table 7: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime II when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues
the strategy in the column. Our parameter values are cW = 0.1, cL = 0.6, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according
to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S) − E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the
row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue
when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when
10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2. The column strategies correspond to the row strategies
with the same letter. We assign a common letter to strategies that are identical in parameter regime II. We abbreviate
strategies as follows: AllH = Always Hawk; X%D = X% Dove and otherwise Hawk; AllD = Always Dove; TfT = Tit for Tat;
Pav = Pavlov; MPav = Modified Pavlov; Bul = Bully; N = Nash; PDT = PD Tit for Tat; MN = Mixed Nash; Slf = Selfish;
SDT = Snowdrift Tit for Tat; and InT = Informed Tit for Tat.
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N
(A) AllH −29.7 27.2 84.5 141.5 198.7 −28.7 −28.7 84.5 25.8 33.0 25.1 50.1 −19.0 −18.7
(B) 25%D −22.2 26.8 75.8 124.8 173.8 27.4 −21.2 75.7 27.4 37.2 30.1 68.0 5.6 22.3
(C) 50%D −14.9 26.1 67.0 108.0 149.0 67.5 −13.3 67.1 29.3 41.3 35.4 79.3 26.2 52.5
(D) 75%D −7.5 25.5 58.4 91.3 124.2 91.4 −4.9 58.4 31.3 45.6 40.6 83.9 43.2 72.3
(E) AllD 0.0 24.9 49.6 74.5 99.3 99.3 99.3 49.8 49.8 49.7 45.8 81.9 56.4 81.9
(F) TfT −29.7 26.6 66.9 91.2 99.3 99.3 99.3 69.7 31.2 −16.3 −17.9 47.1 −6.4 47.0
(G) Grim −29.6 27.3 84.1 140.4 99.3 99.3 99.3 86.4 37.6 −16.2 −17.7 47.0 −6.6 47.1
(H) Pav −14.8 26.1 67.1 107.9 149.2 70.2 6.0 96.4 80.1 41.4 35.3 80.3 26.9 54.2
(I) MPav −5.0 38.2 81.0 123.7 148.8 64.7 13.9 101.0 48.7 37.6 31.9 76.0 18.8 45.2
(J) Bul, N, PDT 36.5 64.6 92.7 120.9 149.0 86.5 86.4 92.8 86.8 99.3 90.2 131.5 53.8 79.4
(K) MN 34.5 64.2 93.6 123.3 152.8 83.7 77.7 93.7 85.5 96.4 88.7 135.4 51.2 76.6
(L) Slf 37.4 59.6 80.2 99.3 116.8 106.4 106.4 80.5 79.1 67.2 63.3 99.3 73.9 99.3
(M) SDT 5.2 52.9 91.4 121.3 142.2 94.1 94.1 93.0 74.4 61.4 59.8 124.8 33.4 87.0
(N) InT 5.3 48.8 81.9 104.6 116.8 106.3 106.4 83.8 67.7 36.1 34.3 99.3 45.8 99.3
Table 8: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime III when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues
the strategy in the column. Our parameter values are cW = 0.1, cL = 1.2, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according
to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S) − E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the
row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue
when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when
10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2. The column strategies correspond to the row strategies
with the same letter. We assign a common letter to strategies that are identical in parameter regime III. We abbreviate
strategies as follows: AllH = Always Hawk; X%D = X% Dove and otherwise Hawk; AllD = Always Dove; TfT = Tit for Tat;
Pav = Pavlov; MPav = Modified Pavlov; Bul = Bully; N = Nash; PDT = PD Tit for Tat; MN = Mixed Nash; Slf = Selfish;
SDT = Snowdrift Tit for Tat; and InT = Informed Tit for Tat.
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3.4. Discussion of tournament results for informed strategies
From Tables 6, 7, and 8, we see that no simple strategy is an ESS and
that at least one informed strategy is able to invade each simple strategy.
The only strategy that is a strong ESS in all parameter regimes is PD Tit for
Tat. See column L in Table 6, column N in Table 7, and column J in Table
8. As we described in Table 4, this corresponds to a strategy in which animal
A uses Tit for Tat when faced with a PD or PD–Deadlock stage game, but
otherwise follows the Nash equilibrium.
The fact that PD Tit for Tat is an ESS when animals begin with perfect
knowledge of pA indicates that PD Tit for Tat should be the main (or even
only) strategy that we observe when animals are able to perfectly assess each
other’s RHP without the need for fighting. Suppose that animal A pursues a
PD Tit for Tat strategy. For fixed values of cL and cW , we observe that animal
A’s substrategy (Always Dove, Tit for Tat, or Always Hawk) depends on the
value of pA. For the analysis of learning strategies in Section 4.1, it is useful
to define the critical values of pA that separate the different substrategies
of PD TfT. We define p˜1 and p˜2 such that animal A pursues Always Dove
when 0 ≤ pA < p˜1, Tit for Tat when p˜1 < pA < p˜2, and Always Hawk when
p˜2 < pA ≤ 1. From the definition of PD TfT in Table 4 and the boundaries
between stage-game classifications (see Table 3), we calculate p˜1 and p˜2 in
the different parameter regimes and obtain the results in Table 9.
If both animals in a contest pursue a PD TfT strategy, there are three
different pair behaviors (depending on the values of µA and µB); we show
them in Figure 6. If the stage game is PD, both animals use a TfT substrat-
egy, and we observe that each animal plays Dove in every round. If the stage
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Parameter regimes
Critical values of pA
p˜1 p˜2
I cL/(1− cW + cL) (12 + cL)/(1− cW + cL)
II and IV cL/(1− cW + cL) (1− cW )/(1− cW + cL)
III, V, and VI 1
2
1
2
Table 9: Critical values p˜1 and p˜2 of pA in the PD Tit for Tat strategy. Animal A pursues
Always Dove when 0 ≤ pA < p˜1, Tit for Tat when p˜1 < pA < p˜2, and Always Hawk when
p˜2 < pA ≤ 1. Tit for Tat is not used in parameter regimes III, V, and VI, so p˜1 = p˜2 in
those regimes.
game is PD–Deadlock or Deadlock–PD, one animal uses a TfT substrategy,
and the other uses an Always Hawk substrategy. Consequently, both ani-
mals play Hawk in every round except for the first one. If the stage game
is any other scenario, the animal with the larger RHP uses an Always Hawk
substrategy, and the animal with the smaller RHP uses Always Dove. This
corresponds to a dominance relationship.
All three of the above possible pair behaviors can occur in parameter
regime I. If there is a sufficiently large difference in the RHPs of the two
animals (specifically, if |pA − 12 | > 1−cW−cL2(1−cW+cL)), fighting is too costly for the
animal with the smaller RHP, so there is a dominance relationship. If there
is a moderate difference in the RHPs of the two animals (specifically, if
1−cW−cL
2(1−cW+cL) < |pA− 12 | <
cW+cL
2(1−cW+cL)), then fighting is not too costly, and there
is a fight between the two animals in every round. Tit for Tat is a better
substrategy for the weaker animal than always playing Dove, but the cost of
fighting is sufficiently small for the stronger animal that Tit for Tat from the
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Figure 6: Pair behaviors when both animals in a contest pursue a PD Tit for Tat strategy
as a function of µA and µB (which are, respectively, the expected payoffs from a fight to
animal A and animal B). We label this plot as in Figure 4, so (a) designates a Prisoner’s
Dilemma–Deadlock game, (b) designates Deadlock–Prisoner’s Dilemma, (c) designates
Prisoner’s Dilemma–Snowdrift, and (d) designates Deadlock–Snowdrift. The blue lines
(from left to right) show the possible values of µA and µB when (cW , cL) = (0.1, 1.2),
(cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.6), and (cW , cL) = (0.1, 0.2). We use coloring to indicate the observed
pair behavior. We use pink when animals play Hawk against each other in all but the first
round, white when animals play Dove against each other in every round, and light blue
when the animal with a larger RHP plays Hawk in every round and the animal with a
smaller RHP plays Dove in every round.
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weaker animal is not a sufficient threat to prevent the stronger animal from
playing Hawk in every round. If there is a sufficiently small difference in
the RHPs of the two animals (specifically, if |pA − 12 | < cW+cL2(1−cW+cL)), sharing
resources gives a better result for the stronger animal than continual fighting.
Therefore, Tit for Tat is a credible threat, and both animals play Dove in
every round to avoid the cost of fighting.
In parameter regime II (and also in regime IV), the possible pair behav-
iors are dominance relationships (when |pA − 12 | > 1−cW−cL2(1−cW+cL)) and resource
sharing (when |pA− 12 | < 1−cW−cL2(1−cW+cL)). Sharing, in which both animals pursue
a Tit for Tat substrategy, occurs if and only if the expected payoff from a fight
is positive for both animals. In this situation, the animal with the smaller
RHP expects to do better from a Hawk–Hawk fight than it would from play-
ing Dove against its opponent’s Hawk, and the animal with the larger RHP
expects to do better from sharing than it would from a Hawk–Hawk fight.
Therefore, the animal with the smaller RHP can credibly threaten the animal
with the larger RHP with the possibility of fighting if it does not participate
in sharing, and Tit for Tat becomes an effective substrategy for both animals.
In parameter regime III (and also in regimes V and VI), the only possible
pair behavior is a dominance relationship. The animal with the larger RHP
always plays Hawk, and the animal with the smaller RHP always plays Dove.
Because fighting is costly (especially for the loser) in parameter regime III,
dominance relationships are favored, even when the difference between the
animals’ RHPs is arbitrarily small.
In summary, we find that if both animals pursue a PD Tit for Tat strategy,
there are three possible pair behaviors (a dominance relationship, continual
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fights, and sharing of resources) in parameter regime I, two possible pair
behaviors (a dominance relationship and sharing of resources) in parameter
regimes II and IV, and only one possible pair behavior (a dominance relation-
ship) in parameter regimes III, V, and VI. From Figure 5, we see that cW +cL
(i.e., the sum of the fighting cost for the two animals) is a key parameter for
determining possible pair behaviors. If cW + cL <
1
2
, dominance relationship,
continual fights, or sharing of resources can occur; if 1
2
< cW +cL < 1, sharing
of resources or dominance relationships can occur; and if cW + cL > 1, there
are only dominance relationships.
4. Analysis of strategies for animals with no knowledge of pA
The pair behaviors that we outlined in Section 3.4 occur only if both
animals in a contest pursue a PD TfT strategy. Because PD TfT is an in-
formed strategy, the observation of such behavior depends on the ability of
the two animals to perfectly assess each other’s RHPs (and hence the value of
pA) before a contest begins. However, perfect assessment of RHP is unlikely
without paying some cost; animals obtain some information from conven-
tional signals, but there is evolutionary pressure towards costliness of signals
and assessment to ensure their accuracy (Dawkins and Guilford, 1991; Arnott
and Elwood, 2009). We can incorporate a costly assessment process into our
model by assuming that animals start a contest with no information about pA
but use (potentially costly) Hawk–Hawk fights to obtain information about
pA; in turn, an animal’s beliefs about pA guides its behavior.
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4.1. Defining learning strategies
We mathematically model assessment using learning strategies from Bayesian
updating (see Section 2.3). Let animal A pursue a learning strategy. At the
outset of a contest, we represent animal A’s initial beliefs about the param-
eter pA as a beta distribution Beta(α0, β0); we need to specify the values
of α0 and β0 as part of the definition of the learning strategy. After each
Hawk–Hawk fight, we update animal A’s beliefs about pA. If animal A has
won m fights and lost n fights since the beginning of a contest, we represent
its beliefs about pA by the beta distribution Beta(α0 +m,β0 + n).
In each round, animal A decides its move using a memory-1 substrategy
s (see Section 3.3) that depends on its current beliefs about pA. We need to
specify the functional relationship between animal A’s beliefs (represented by
the probability distribution Beta(α, β)) about pA in a given round and the
memory-1 substrategy s that it uses in that round as part of the definition
of the learning strategy.
We base the relationship between animal A’s current beliefs and its cur-
rent substrategy on the PD Tit for Tat informed strategy. As an animal
becomes more certain about pA, its behavior should converge to that of an
informed animal that uses a PD TfT strategy. Therefore, as α and β approach
infinity with α
α+β
→ pA, the substrategy that is associated with Beta(α, β)
should converge to the PD TfT strategy that is associated with that value
of pA.
There are numerous plausible learning strategies that are consistent with
the PD Tit for Tat strategy in the above sense, and there are numerous
possible choices for α0 and β0. As with the informed strategies that we
46
described in Section 3.2, we define a small set of plausible learning strategies
and compare them using tournaments. We consider four types of learning
strategies (which we define precisely later in this section):
(1) weighted learning strategies,
(2) mean-based learning strategies,
(3) median-based learning strategies, and
(4) high-quantile learning strategies.
For fixed cW and cL, recall that the substrategy that is associated with the
PD TfT strategy changes abruptly as pA passes through the critical values
p˜1 and p˜2 (see Table 9). These critical values of pA are important for all of
the different learning strategies.
In a weighted learning strategy, we construct the substrategy vector s by
taking a weighted mean of substrategy vectors for the different substrategies
in PD TfT. The weighting for Always Dove is given by the probability that
pA ∈ (0, p˜1), the weighting for Tit for Tat is given by the probability that
pA ∈ (p˜1, p˜2), and the weighting for Always Hawk is given by the probability
that pA ∈ (p˜2, 1). Let f(x) denote the probability density function of the dis-
tribution Beta(α, β); and let sD, sTfT, and sH denote the substrategy vectors
of ‘Always Dove’, ‘Tit for Tat’, and ‘Always Hawk’, respectively. We then
write the substrategy vector for animal A’s weighted learning strategy as
s = sD
∫ p˜1
0
f(x) dx+ sTfT
∫ p˜2
p˜1
f(x) dx+ sH
∫ 1
p˜2
f(x) dx . (5)
In a mean-based learning strategy, s is the substrategy from the PD TfT
that is associated with the mean of the distribution of an animal’s current
47
beliefs about pA. Because the mean of Beta(α, β) is given by
α
α+β
, animal
A’s strategy is
s =

sD , 0 ≤ αα+β < p˜1 ,
sTfT , p˜1 ≤ αα+β < p˜2 ,
sH , p˜2 ≤ αα+β ≤ 1 .
(6)
To maximize the amount of information that is obtained by a learning animal,
we make the most aggressive available choice for s when α
α+β
is at a critical
value. For example, when α
α+β
= p˜2, we use the Always Hawk substrategy,
rather than Tit for Tat or Always Dove.
A median-based learning strategy is identical to a mean-based learning
strategy, except that we use the median of the distribution Beta(α, β) instead
of the mean. High-quantile learning strategies also use the same principle,
but they are based on some other quantile of the distribution of an animal’s
beliefs about pA. By basing such a learning strategy on a high quantile,
an animal can behave aggressively until it has enough information to have
a prescribed amount of confidence that aggressive behavior is suboptimal.
For example, if animal A pursues a learning strategy that is based on the
0.95 quantile, it uses an Always Hawk substrategy until the 0.95 quantile of
Beta(α, β) is below the critical value p˜2. Therefore, the animal plays Hawk
during every move until it is 95% confident that pA < p˜2.
In addition to specifying the relationship between current beliefs and cur-
rent substrategy, it is important to specify each animal’s initial beliefs about
pA. Recall that we represent these initial beliefs by Beta(α0, β0). Because
we assume that animals have no information about pA, apart from the fact
that pA ∼ Beta(k, k), at the beginning of a contest, it may appear natural to
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choose α0 = β0 = k. However, there are potential advantages for an animal
to use a prior that reflects its “optimism” about its chances of winning fights
(as reflected by a large value of α0 and/or a small value of β0). Such an
animal engages in more fights in the early rounds of a contest to gain infor-
mation about its RHP relative to its opponent. Although one possible result
is weak animals sustaining avoidable costs that it would not obtain with an
unbiased prior, these costs can be outweighed by the benefits to stronger
animals that might otherwise have “given up” following an unlucky loss in
an early fight if they had used an unbiased prior. Consequently, the expected
payoff (averaged over all values of pA) may be higher for an animal that uses
a biased prior with α0 > β0, instead of an unbiased prior.
For the mean-based, median-based, and high-quantile learning strategies,
we make two important modifications to the strategies to deal with problems
that can arise when changing substrategies. The first of these features is a
delay in adopting Tit for Tat. We specify that any animal that shifts from
Always Hawk to Tit for Tat plays Dove for two rounds before beginning the
Tit for Tat process of imitating its opponent’s move. To understand why this
is important, suppose that animal B pursues a Tit for Tat strategy, while
animal A changes its substrategy from Always Hawk to Tit for Tat after
round m. Because animal A has been playing Always Hawk up to this point
and animal B is imitating this choice in its Tit for Tat strategy, animal B’s
move during round m is Hawk. If animal A immediately switches to Tit for
Tat for round m+1, the two animals will continue to play Hawk during every
move. If animal A plays Dove during round m + 1 and then starts copying
animal B’s previous move starting from round m + 2, the two animals will
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alternate Dove–Hawk and Hawk–Dove in all rounds starting from m + 1.
The only way to create the possibility of Dove–Dove interactions in all future
rounds is for animal A to play Dove for two rounds before pursuing a Tit for
Tat substrategy.
The second modification that we make to the mean-based, median-based,
and quantile learning strategies is to introduce hysteresis to prevent overly
frequent changes in substrategy. For mean-based and median-based strate-
gies, we allow the specification of two different priors; one (the main prior,
with parameters α0 and β0) determines whether to change to a less aggressive
substrategy, and the other (the secondary prior, with parameters α¯0 and β¯0)
determines whether to change to a more aggressive substrategy. We require
the secondary prior to be less optimistic about pA than the main prior, in
the sense that α¯0 ≤ α0 and β¯0 ≥ β0.
To explain the use of these priors, suppose that an animal A pursues a
mean-based learning strategy in which the secondary prior is different from
the main prior. We use the main prior to decide the substrategy for the
animal’s first move of the contest. Suppose that α0
α0+β0
≥ p˜2, so the animal’s
substrategy in the first round is Always Hawk. As the contest progresses,
if the mean α
α+β
of the main distribution goes from above p˜2 to below p˜2,
then s changes from sH to sTfT. In this sense, the main prior determines
whether to change from a more-aggressive substrategy (Always Hawk) to
a less-aggressive substrategy (Tit for Tat). If α
α+β
subsequently goes from
below p˜2 to above p˜2, an animal does not immediately change substrategy
again. If the true value of pA is near p˜2, chance can lead to frequent changes
between Always Hawk and Tit for Tat as α
α+β
fluctuates around p˜2. Because
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an animal that changes from an Always Hawk substrategy to a Tit for Tat
substrategy plays Dove for at least two rounds, it is suboptimal for it to make
frequent changes in its substrategy. Instead, the animal changes from sTfT
back to sH only if the mean
α¯
α¯+β¯
of the secondary distribution increases above
p˜2. Because α¯0 ≤ α0 and β¯0 ≥ β0 (and equality cannot occur simultaneously
in the two inequalities when the main and secondary priors differ from each
other), it follows that α¯
α¯+β¯
< α
α+β
, so α¯
α¯+β¯
increases above p˜2 only after
α
α+β
increases above p˜2. Therefore, the use of the secondary prior introduces
hysteresis into a contest between two animals.
For high-quantile strategies, we also introduce hysteresis, but this time
we do so by specifying a main quantile and a secondary quantile rather
than by specifying a main prior and a secondary prior. We require the
secondary quantile to be lower than the main quantile. In a quantile-based
strategy, an animal changes from an Always Hawk substrategy to a Tit for
Tat substrategy if the main quantile of Beta(α, β) goes from above p˜2 to
below p˜2; and it changes from a Tit for Tat substrategy to an Always Hawk
substrategy if the secondary quantile of Beta(α, β) goes from below p˜2 to
above p˜2. Similarly, an animal changes from a Tit for Tat substrategy to an
Always Dove substrategy if the main quantile of Beta(α, β) goes from above
p˜1 to below it.
4.2. Tournament for comparing learning strategies
As in Section 3.3, we use tournaments to compare the performance of sev-
eral learning strategies against each other and against the 9 simple memory-1
strategies from Table 5. In our tournaments, we consider 16 different learn-
ing strategies. For each type of learning strategy (weighted, mean-based,
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median-based, and high-quantile), we consider 4 different strategies, which
entail different levels of aggression. A more aggressive animal is willing to
pay a higher cost for information about RHPs, and it requires more evidence
(in the form of defeats in fights) before it will adopt a less aggressive sub-
strategy (e.g., changing from an Always Hawk substrategy to a Tit for Tat
substrategy). In Table 10, we outline the 25 learning strategies that we use
in our tournaments, and below we describe them in more detail. Addition-
ally, we take k = 1, so we draw pA from a uniform distribution. As with our
tournaments in Section 3.3, we obtain the same qualitatively results when
we instead use k = 1
2
or k = 2.
For weighted, mean-based, and median-based learning strategies, we en-
code aggressiveness through the values of the shape parameters (α0, β0) that
determine an animal’s initial beliefs about its chances of winning a fight.
We interpret these parameters biologically by comparing them with the true
distribution pA ∼ Beta(k, k) for the probability of winning a fight. When the
distribution Beta(α0, β0) determines an animal’s prior beliefs about winning
a fight, the animal acts as if it believes that it has already won α0 − k fights
and lost β0−k fights at the beginning of a contest. In our learning strategies,
we fix β0 = k and modify the level of aggression by using different values of
α0. Specifically, we consider α0 = k, α0 = k+4, α0 = k+8, and α0 = k+12.
As we described in Section 4.1, mean-based and median-based learning
strategies can include a secondary prior Beta(α¯0, β¯0) to incorporate hysteresis
into the process of changing substrategies. We take α¯0 = β¯0 = k in all
mean-based and median-based strategies. In our results for k = 1, this
choice entails a flat prior when making decisions about increasing the level
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of aggression.
We use the same prior for all high-quantile strategies, for which we exam-
ine different aggression levels by using different quantiles of the distribution
to reflect an animal’s beliefs about its chances of winning a fight. For the four
different aggression levels, we use the 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.98 quantiles. In the
most aggressive strategy, which is based on the 0.98 quantile, an animal uses
an Always Hawk substrategy until it has a 2% or lower confidence that pA is
in the range where Always Hawk is the best substrategy. As described above,
we use a secondary quantile for deciding when to change from a less aggres-
sive substrategy to a more aggressive substrategy; this quantile is lower than
the main quantile. We use 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.95 as the secondary quantiles
for 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.98, respectively.
In Tables 11, 12, and 13, we present our results for our tournaments in pa-
rameter regimes I, II, and III, respectively. We indicate strategies using our
notation from Table 10. We color the squares in Tables 11–13 according to the
values of Q(T, S) = [E(T, S)−E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)]. See the supplemen-
tary material for the values of the mean payoffs E(T, S). (They are also avail-
able at https://bitbucket.org/CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/.)
Each contest consists of 1000 rounds; we use the parameter values k = 1,
γ = 0.995, and cW = 0.1. To examine results in the three main parameter
regimes, we consider cL = 0.2, cL = 0.6, and cL = 1.2 in the three tourna-
ments. In all tournaments, we use the variance-reduction techniques from
Section 3.3.
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Label Strategy type Description/details of prior
A Simple Always Hawk
B Simple 25% Dove
C Simple 50% Dove
D Simple 75% Dove
E Simple Always Dove
F Simple Tit for Tat
G Simple Grim
H Simple Pavlov
I Simple Modified Pavlov
J Weighted learning Prior: Beta(1, 1) (flat)
K Weighted learning Prior: Beta(5, 1)
L Weighted learning Prior: Beta(9, 1)
M Weighted learning Prior: Beta(13, 1)
N Mean-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(1, 1) (flat)
O Mean-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(5, 1)
P Mean-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(9, 1)
Q Mean-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(13, 1)
R Median-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(1, 1) (flat)
S Median-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(5, 1)
T Median-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(9, 1)
U Median-based learning Prior for decreasing aggression: Beta(13, 1)
V Quantile-based learning Flat prior; Quantile for decreasing aggression: 0.8
W Quantile-based learning Flat prior; Quantile for decreasing aggression: 0.9
X Quantile-based learning Flat prior; Quantile for decreasing aggression: 0.95
Y Quantile-based learning Flat prior; Quantile for decreasing aggression: 0.98
Table 10: Description of the 25 strategies that we use in our tournaments of learning
strategues. The first column indicates the label for the strategy (see Tables 11–13), the
second column indicates the strategy type, and the third column gives some further details
about the strategy.
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Table 11: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime I when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues the
strategy in the column. The letters in the rows and columns correspond to the strategies in Table 10. Our parameter values are
cW = 0.1, cL = 0.2, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S)−E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T
is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated
by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are
dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when 10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2.
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Table 12: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime II when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues the
strategy in the column. The letters in the rows and columns correspond to the strategies in Table 10. Our parameter values are
cW = 0.1, cL = 0.6, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S)−E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T
is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated
by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are
dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when 10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2.
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Table 13: Overall payoffs to animal A in parameter regime III when it pursues the strategy in the row and animal B pursues the
strategy in the column. The letters in the rows and columns correspond to the strategies in Table 10. Our parameter values are
cW = 0.1, cL = 1.2, γ = 0.995, and k = 1. We color cells according to Q(T, S) = [E(T, S)−E(S, S)]/[E(AllH,AllD)], where T
is the strategy that is pursued by animal A (indicated by the row) and S is the strategy that is pursued by animal B (indicated
by the column). Cells are red when Q(T, S) > 10−3, blue when Q(T, S) < −10−3, and white when |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−3. Cells are
dark when |Q(T, S)| > 10−1, of a medium shade when 10−2 < |Q(T, S)| ≤ 10−1, and light when 10−3 < |Q(T, S)| < 10−2.
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As in Section 3.3, we use the colors in Tables 11, 12, and 13 to iden-
tify ESSs. Recall that the colors indicate whether a mutant with a different
strategy can successfully invade a population of animals who are using a sin-
gle strategy. We use the colors to indicate how different strategies perform
against each other. In these tables, a mutant pursues a strategy in the row
and the population strategy is in the column. The color of a cell indicates
whether the expected payoff to the mutant is more than, the same as, or
less than the expected payoff for an animal using the population strategy
against another animal using the population strategy. A red cell indicates
that a mutant has a higher payoff than animals in the population, so the row
strategy can successfully invade the column strategy. By contrast, a blue cell
indicates that the mutant has a lower payoff than animals in the population,
so the column strategy is resistant to invasion by that row strategy. A white
cell indicates that the mutant has a similar or identical payoff to the pop-
ulation, so genetic drift may lead to a mixed population with animals who
pursue both strategies.
Unlike in our tournaments in Section 3.3, we do not observe any strong
ESSs. That is, Tables 11, 12, and 13 do not have any columns for which every
non-diagonal cell is blue. For the most part, however, we observe that the
learning strategies (J–Y) are resistant to invasion by the simple strategies (A–
I). We can see this from the frequent presence of blue cells in the upper-right
corner of Tables 11, 12, and 13. We also observe that the least aggressive
(i.e., with α0 = β0 = 1) mean-based and median-based strategies are less
successful than the other learning strategies, as columns N and R have more
red cells than the other learning-strategy columns.
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Aside from the mean-based and median-based strategies with α0 = 1
(which do very poorly, as we noted above), weighted strategies are less suc-
cessful than other learning strategies, especially in parameter regime III.
We can see this from the presence of red cells (although there are no dark-
red cells) in columns J–M. Additionally, the most aggressive mean-based,
median-based, and high-quantile strategies are less successful (in the sense of
being vulnerable to invasion) than some other learning strategies in parame-
ter regime III. We can see this from the red cells in columns Q and Y (and,
to a lesser extent, in column U).
We also observe many white and light-colored cells (especially in param-
eter regime I) when a pair of learning strategies interact with each other.
Therefore, it appears that a variety of different learning strategies may be
able to coexist successfully. In a population in which animals use results
from fights to inform their long-term behavior, there may not be one op-
timal strategy for using such information. Mean-based, median-based, and
high-quantile learning strategies all have the potential to be effective if the
aggression-level parameters (i.e., α0 for the mean-based and median-based
strategies and the quantile for the high-quantile strategies) are not too large
or too small. Parameter regime I appears to have the broadest range of
parameter values that correspond to effective learning strategies, possibly
because the penalty for fighting is relatively small.
One prominent feature of the results in Tables 11–13 is that every cell in
column G is either dark blue or white. This illustrates that the simple ‘Grim’
strategy is very successful, although it is not a strong ESS, as evidenced by
the white off-diagonal cells. These white cells indicate that mutant animals
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who use some other strategies (e.g., Always Dove or Tit for Tat) obtain the
same payoff as animals in a population using the Grim strategy, enabling the
mutants to invade the population because of genetic drift. A population of
animals that play Grim all do very well, as they share their resources during
each round. However, a mutant animal that pursues a learning strategy in a
population of animals who play Grim is very unsuccessful. When a mutant
plays Hawk to obtain information about its probability of winning fights,
the response of a Grim is to punish the mutant by playing Hawk in every
subsequent round. Even if the mutant has a relatively large RHP, this is
likely to lead to an overall payoff that is lower than what it would obtain by
playing Dove in every round.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
We have developed a model of animal conflict based on an iterated Hawk–
Dove game to analyze how different factors affect whether the outcome of a
contest between animals is resource sharing, overt aggression, or the forma-
tion of a dominance relationship. We have shown that one can use the same
model to explore the conditions under which very different outcomes are evo-
lutionarily stable and that key factors in deciding which outcomes occur are
costs of fighting, degree of asymmetry between animals in a contest, and the
ability to learn from experience.
Through extensive computations, we found that sharing is stable only
when the cost of fighting is low and the animals in a contest have similar
resource holding potentials, whereas dominance relationships are stable in
most other situations. In our simulations, we explored what happens when
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animals are unable to assess each other’s RHPs without fighting, and we
compared a large variety of strategies for this problem. We found that (1)
the most successful strategies involve a limited period of assessment followed
by a stable relationship in which fights are avoided and that (2) the duration
of assessment depends both on the costliness of fighting and on the difference
between the animals’ RHPs in a contest.
Although the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma and its later modifications (e.g.,
see Axelrod (1984); Nowak (2006)) have been cited extensively as evidence
for the evolution of cooperation and resource sharing, our findings show that
sharing is stable only under rather limited conditions — specifically, when
the cost of fighting is low and the animals in a contest have similar RHPs. As
the asymmetries between animals become larger, resource sharing becomes
less stable. By contrast, dominance hierarchies are stable for a much wider
range of conditions. The reason for this observation appears to be that pro-
gressively larger differences in RHPs make it progressively more beneficial
both for the stronger animal in a contest to fight (rather than share) and for
the weaker animal to demur without even displaying or attempting to fight,
such that a dominance hierarchy develops readily in the face of asymmetries
and becomes progressively more stable for progressively larger asymmetries
(Dawkins, 2010). This provides an explanation for why dominance hierar-
chies are so widespread (Huntingford and Turner, 1987; Bonabeau, 1999;
Braddock and Braddock, 1955; Beacham and Newman, 1987; Chase, 1982;
Drummond, 2006; Guhl, 1968; O’Donnell, 1998). Our model shows that the
most successful strategies involve a limited period of assessment followed by
longer period in which fights are avoided and a stable dominance hierarchy
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is established (Chase, 1982; Pagel and Dawkins, 1997). The duration of as-
sessment depends both on the costliness of fighting and on the difference
between the RHPs of animals in a contest.
We explored only a small number of the myriad strategies that are pos-
sible in our iterated asymmetry Hawk–Dove game. To promote future work
on our approach, we have developed software (see https://bitbucket.org/
CameronLHall/dominancesharingassessmentmatlab/) to allow readers to
pursue our ideas further and extend them to a wider range of questions. For
example, the informed strategies that we considered in Section 3 are examples
of the memory-1 Markovian strategies in Nowak and Sigmund (1993b) and
Press and Dyson (2012). An interesting extension is to consider memory-1
Markovian strategies for iterated asymmetric games more generally, follow-
ing a similar approach to those in Nowak and Sigmund (1990) and Nowak
and Sigmund (1993b). Another interesting extension is to define and analyze
extortionate strategies (as defined in Press and Dyson (2012)) for the iterated
asymmetric Hawk–Dove game. However, the fact that extortionate strate-
gies are not ESSs in the classical IPD (Adami and Hintze, 2013) suggests
that such strategies are unlikely to be evolutionarily stable in asymmetric
contests. Other valuable extensions include the consideration of memory-s
strategies for s ≥ 2, analysis of the impact of bifurcations in the dynamics
of tournaments with noise, and the study of tournaments of animals on net-
works (to examine the effects of different structures in which contests occur)
(Szabo´, 2007). We hope that the simplicity of our model and the ease of use
of our software will enable the development of answers to these and many
other questions about animal conflict.
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